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The Literal-Metaphorical-Anomalous Distinction
Abstract
Children's ability to distinguish among literal, metaphorical and
anomalous comparisons was investigated. Three, four, five and six year
old children as well as adults were asked to complete similarity state-
ments choosing one of two words from (a) a metaphorical/literal word pair
alternative, (b) a literal/anomalous word pair alternative and (c) a
metaphorical/anomalous word pair alternative. Selections were also made
in a categorization task. Results suggested that even the youngest
children could distinguish meaningful comparisons from anomalous ones,
while four year old and older children provided data suggesting that they
were aware that the terms from the metaphorical comparisons, unlike the
literal ones, belonged to different conventional categories. These results
were interpreted as indicating that already by four years children have
some rudimentary metaphorical competence.
The Emergence of the Literal-Metaphorical-Anomalous
Distinction in Young Children
Many investigators of metaphor would agree that the production and
comprehension of metaphor involves the recognition of some novel similarity
between concepts that belong to different conventional categories. Thus,
when we credit a child with producing or understanding a metaphor as a
nonliteral use of language, we are tacitly assuming that the child in fact
has the conventional categories that are supposed to be violated by the
comparison involved in the metaphor.
Take for example the case of ayoung child who during play calls a
green carpet "grass" (Billow, in press). Some investigators of metaphor,
like Billow (in press) and Winner, McCarhty, Kleiman and Gardner (in press,
Winner, McCarhty & Gardner, 1980), argue that if the use of "grass" in
this context is not an overextension caused by lack of knowledge of the
word "carpet," but is a "renaming" (Winner, et al., in press), then it
involves a deliberate violation of conventional category boundaries. This
in turn is thought to justify calling such productions metaphors.
Others, (e.g., Piaget, 1962), argue that such utterances may be based
on the perception of some similarity between the objects being compared,
but refrain from calling them metaphors. Piaget (1962) calls them "verbal
schemas" and "preconcepts" that are "intermediary between the schemas of
sensory motor intelligence and conceptual schemas . . ." (p. 218).
According to Piaget, the child needs to have the hierarchical ordering of
classes and the complete comprehension of class inclusion relations
characteristic of the concrete operational stage before he or she can be
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credited with the ability to categorize. It follows from this that the
production and comprehension of metaphors as figurative devices must await
the later stages of concrete operations (see, for example, Cometa & Eson,
1978).
In our opinion both of these positions are too extreme. For example,
it is by no means clear that renaming is necessarily metaphorical in nature.
If, in calling a green carpet "grass" the child is merely noticing an
(interesting) similarity of color and texture, this hardly seems sufficient
to justify calling the production metaphorical. Nor is it enough to know
that the child knows the word for carpet. Rather, what seems to be needed
is that the child also knows that carpets and grass belong to different
conventional categories.
The issue, of course, all hinges on what one means by calling a pro-
duction a metaphor. Our view is that there are several criteria, each
adding to the quality and depth of a metaphor. A necessary condition for
a statement to be considered metaphorical is that it is based on a meaning-
ful comparison between terms drawn from different conventional categories,
although, as Sternbergandhis collaborators (e.g., Sternberg, Tourangeau
& Nigro, 1979; Tourangeau & Sternberg, in press) have noted, the less remote
these categories are, the less metaphorical is the comparison. Another
criterion--one that usually characterizes adult metaphors but, as we will
later argue, is rarely present in child metaphors--is that the respects in
which the two things are alike are differentially important or central to
the two terms. Ortony (1979) refers to these two sources of metaphoricity
as domain incongruence and salience imbalance respectively. The claim is
that if two terms come from different domains they cannot be literally
similar because they are different kinds of things. However, comparisons
between such terms are not necessarily meaningless. Thus, there seem to
be three kinds of similarity statements: (a) There are literal similarity
statements such as A river is like a lake. These are cases in which there
are discernible nontrivial similarities between objects belonging to the
same category. (b) There are nonliteral similarity statements such as A
river is like a snake. These are cases in which there are discernible
nontrivial similarities between objects belonging to different conventional
categories. We shall sometimes refer to such statements as metaphorical
comparisons. Finally, (c) there are anomalous similarity statements such
as A river is like a cat, in which the compared terms come from different
categories but where there are no discernible nontrivial similarities.
If metaphors are defined in terms of nonliteral similarity, then we
need to know whether the child who is credited with the ability to produce
and comprehend metaphors can distinguish literal from nonliteral similarity,
rather than whether he or she can merely distinguish meaningful comparisons
from anomalous ones, or whether he or she has a complete understanding of
hierarchical ordering and class inclusion relations.
The experiment we conducted was designed as a first step towards
exploring children's distinctions between literal, metaphorical, and
anomalous comparisons. It should be stressed that we were interested, in
this part of the investigation, in examining children's conceptions of
similarity as they relate to the understanding of verbal metaphor. Thus,
the task we used was a verbal one that probed children's conceptions of
similarity based on their representations of objects in memory.
The Literal-Metaphorical-Anomalous Distinction
The Literal-Metaphorical-Anomalous Distinction
In the experiment children and adults were asked to verbally complete
statements of the form "A is like . . .," such as "A river is like a .. ."
choosing one of two words. This task will be referred to as the comparison
task. Each A term (e.g., river) in these incomplete similarity statements
appeared in combination with three word pairs each of which resulted in
different types of comparisons: First, a metaphorical/literal word pair
(hereafter the M/L pair type) was used which resulted either in a metaphor-
ical or a literal comparison. For example, given river as the A term, a
child would have to choose between snake and lake to complete the similarity
statement. The second type of word pair was a literal/anomalous word pair
(hereafter an L/A pair type) resulting either in a literal or an anomalous
comparison. In this case a child would have to choose between lake and cat.
Finally, a metaphorical/anomalous word pair (hereafter an M/A pair type) was
used. This resulted either in a metaphorical or an anomalous comparison,
so that, again, given river as the A term, a child would have to choose
between snake and cat.
It was assumed that the selection of literal and metaphorical compar-
isons over anomalous ones in the L/A and M/A pair types respectively would
justify attributing to the children the ability to distinguish meaningful
similarity statements from anomalous ones. In particular, a preference
for metaphorical over anomalous comparisons would be evidence that the
child recognized some similarity in the metaphorical case. It was further
assumed that the selection of the literal over the metaphorical comparison
in the L/M pair type would be evidence that the children perceived the
terms in the literal comparisons to be more similar than those in the
metaphorical comparisons.
Since the recognition of a metaphorical statement as metaphorical
usually requires the realization that conventional category boundaries
are being transgressed, it was also necessary to determine how subjects
viewed the categorical relationships within the items. For this reason,
another group of children and adults received instructions to complete
statements in which the word "like" was substituted by "the same kind of
thing as." In this categorization task the literal choices clearly become
the correct ones and the metaphorical ones become inappropriate, something
that is not true in the comparison task. For example, while both lake
and snake may be equally acceptable choices to complete the sentence, "A
river is like a . . .," only lake is a suitable completion for "A river is
the same kind of thing as a . . ." Thus, manipulating the task in this way
enabled us to check that subjects doing the comparison task could be
expected to possess the conventional categories whose violations were
involved in the metaphorical comparisons.
Method
Subjects. The subjects were 20 3 year olds (mean age 3:7), 20 4 year
olds (4:7), 20 5 year olds (5:6), 20 6 year olds (6:6), and 20 adults
(undergraduate students). In each group approximately half of the children
were boys and half were girls.
Materials. Ten nouns referring to concrete objects were used as A
terms. Each A term had three B terms (BL , BM and BA ) associated with it,
such that when appearing in a similarity statement, A paired with BL gave
rise to a literal comparison, A paired with BM gave rise to a metaphorical
comparison, and A paired with BA gave rise to an anomalous comparison.
The nouns used as A and B terms are listed in Table 1.
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Insert Table 1 about here.
Each statement consisted of an A term and a pair of its associated B
terms, BM and B , BL and BA, and B and BA . Thus, there were three pair
types of B terms associated with each A term, an M/L pair, an L/A pair,
and an M/A pair, making a total of 30 statements. On each trial a subject
would select one of the two B terms with which he was presented. Subjects
in the comparison task received all 30 statements. The 10 statements
involving the M/A pair type were, however, dropped in the categorization
task because both alternatives resulted in inappropriate choices. Thus
subjects in the categorization task received only 20 statements. Each
subject received a different random order of statements.
Most of the metaphorical alternatives were selected from records of
children's spontaneous metaphor (e.g., Chukovsky, 1968; Koch, 1970), and
focussed on perceptual similarity between the two terms. The literal
alternatives involved objects from the same category as the A term. In
the anomalous alternatives the terms were chosen so as to minimize any
obvious shared attributes.
To confirm our intuitions about the relative degree of similarity
between the different comparison types all the similarity statements were
rated by 15 adult judges on a scale from 1 to 6. For each item the mean
similarity rating for the two terms was always higher for the literal
comparison that for the corresponding metaphorical comparison, which in
turn was always higher than for the corresponding anomalous comparison.
Overall, the mean judged similarity was 4.6 for the literal comparisons,
3.3 for the metaphorical comparisons, and 1.1 for the anomalies. These
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similarity levels are consistent with other data (as yet unpublished)
being collected in our lab.
Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the two tasks, and tested
individually. In the comparison task they were asked to say whether "A
is like B or C," while in the categorization task were asked to say whether
"A is the same kind of thing as B or C." Before indicating their selection
subjects were asked to repeat B and C to make sure that they remembered
and took into consideration both items. At the end of the experimental
session the subjects were asked to justify their last five choices.
Prior to participating in the experiment all the children were given
a pretest of their comprehension of the relations "like" and "same kind of
thing." They were shown three toys--a red truck, a yellow van, and a white
kitchen stove. Children in the comparison task were asked to indicate
both which items were "like" each other and which was "different" from the
others. Since the purpose of the study was to determine whether young
children could distinguish literal from metaphorical similarity, the pretest
only attempted to check that children understood "like" in the context of
literal similarity. Children in the categorization task were asked to
indicate which items were "the same kind of thing" and which was "a
different kind of thing." Two 3 year olds failed to pass this pretest
and were excluded from the experiment. The whole experimental session
lasted approximately 30 minutes, and was tape-recorded.
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Results
First each subject was given a score based on the number of his or
her literal responses in the M/L and L/A pair types in the comparison and
categorization tasks. The mean number of these literal responses in the
two tasks for each age group appears in Table 2. A 5 (Age) x 2 (Task) x
2 (Pair Type) analysis of variance on the literal responses showed main
effects for all the variables. The main effect for Age, F(4,90) = 21.05,
----  - ------
Insert Table 2 about here.
----  - ------
p < .001, was due to an overall increase in the number of literal responses
with age. The main effect for Task, F(l,90) = 51.48, p < .001, was a
result of the greater number of literal responses in the categorization
task than in the comparison task, and the main effect for Pair Type, F(l,90)
= 203.02, p < .001 was due to the greater number of literal responses in
the L/A pairs than the M/L pairs. There was also a significant Age x Task
interaction, F(4,90) = 6.40, p < .001, a significant Task x Pair Type
interaction, F(l,90) = 57.54, p < .001, and a significant Age x Task x
Pair Type interaction, F(3,90) = 4.069, p < .005. The Age x Task inter-
action was due to the greater increase by age in the number of literal
responses in the categorization task than the comparison task. The Task
x Pair Type interaction was the result of the greater number of literal
responses for the L/A pair type than the M/L pair type in the comparison
task but not in the categorization task. Finally, the Age x Task x Pair
Type interaction was due to the lack of an increase with age in the number
of literal responses for the M/L pairs in the comparison task.
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The second part of the analysis involved giving each subject in the
comparison task another score on the basis of the number of his or her
metaphorical responses in the M/L and M/A pair types. The mean number of
these metaphorical responses appears also in Table 2. There, of course,
the responses in the M/L column represent the same data as those from the
literal responses. A 5 (Age) x 2 (Pair Type) analysis of variance on the
metaphorical responses in the comparison task showed a main effect for
Pair Type, F(1,45) = 84.83, p < .01, and an interaction between Age x
Pair Type, F(4,45) = 2.59, p < .05. The main effect for Pair Type was
due to a greater number of metaphorical responses in the M/A pairs than
the M/L pairs. The Age x Pair Type interaction was due to an increase
with age in the number of metaphorical responses in the M/A pairs but not
in the M/L pairs. In this latter case there was no preference for either
the metaphorical or the literal comparison for all age groups.
Using a t test for single means, each mean for all pair types in
both tasks was compared against the probability that it occurred by chance
(.50). As can be seen in Table 2, children of 4 years and older chose
the literal and metaphorical alternatives over the anomalous ones in the
L/A and M/A pairs in both tasks, and they chose the literal over the
metaphorical alternatives in the M/L pairs in the categorization task.
The 3 year olds also rejected the anomalies in the comparison task, but
failed to choose the literal over the metaphorical alternatives in the
categorization task.
Discussion
The first important finding was that in both tasks the children,
even the youngest ones, showed a clear preference for meaningful
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comparisons over anomalous ones. This preference was evidenced by their
rejection of the anomalous alternatives in both the L/A and the M/A pair
types. Of course, as the main effect for age and the different interactions
involving age in both analyses of variance show, the older children did
better at rejecting anomalous comparisons than the younger children. How-
ever, even the 3 year olds rejected anomalies, for the most part, signif-
icantly more often than predicted by chance. It should be mentioned here
that the 3 year olds had some difficulty with a few specific items,
especially those in which the objects belonged to the same category but
did not share many perceptual properties. For example, they consistently
chose the anomalous comparison "eyes are like a bicycle" (presumably
because eyes are round and bicycle wheels are round), over the literal
comparison "eyes are like ears." Such preferences suggest either that
younger children do not have the conventional category well established
(in this case, one that might be called "facial features"), or, that if
they have it, that they also possess a more salient nonconventional
category (e.g., "circular things"). However, the point remains that the
overall rejection of anomalies suggests that even 3 year old children can
distinguish a meaningful comparison from an anomalous one.
The second important finding involves the M/L pair type. As the Age
x Task x Pair Type interaction showed, an increase with age in the number
of literal responses for the M/L pair type occurred only in the categori-
zation task, and not in the comparison task. The lack of preference for
the literal alternatives in the M/L word pairs in the comparison task was
interesting. It vitiates against any developmental account that proposes
that children first understand "real" (i.e., literal) similarity and only
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later, based on that, metaphorical similarity. Such an account would
predict that the young children would always choose the literal alternatives,
with no-preference only showing up later. In fact, the data shows no-
preference responses at all ages. None of the groups selected literal or
metaphorical completions significantly more often than chance. In other
words, the 3 year olds, like adults, treat metaphorical similarity state-
ments as bona fide similarity statements. Thus the crucial result in the
comparison task is the universal rejection of anomalies.
It might still be argued that at least the adult subjects should have
preferred the literal over the metaphorical pairs, especially since the
adult ratings for the corresponding comparisons indicated that their per-
ceived similarity was greater. This lack of preference can be explained
if it is assumed that subjects, realizing that both alternatives were
"correct," employed one of several alternative strategies to resolve their
dilemma. Inspection of the protocols showed that most adults and older
children were quite systematic, some choosing predominately metaphorical
comparisons, others making primarily literal selections instead.
An increase with age in the number of literal responses in the M/L
pair types did occur in the categorization task, where, in contrast to the
comparison task, the literal alternative was clearly the correct choice.
This difference between the two tasks accounts for the interactions
between age and task, age and pair type, and age, task and pair type
obtained in the analysis of variance on the literal responses. The fact
that in the categorization task all children except the 3 year olds
selected the literal over the metaphorical alternatives significantly
more than chance would predict is important. It suggests that these
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children realized that the terms involved in the metaphorical pairings
belonged to different conventional categories.
It could be objected that the children who selected the literal
alternatives in the categorization task were doing so because they selected
high associates and not because they knew that the two terms belonged to
the same category. While it is true that terms from the same category
are likely to be highly associated, the fact that children of the same age
did not choose the high associate in the comparison task argues against
using association to account for their responses in (only) the categori-
zation task. It is more parsimonious to assume that the children who were
4 years and older chose words that belonged to the same category.
The 3 year old children showed no evidence of distinguishing the
literal from the metaphorical alternatives in the M/L word pairs. Unlike
the older children, their selections for this pair type did not differ in
the two tasks. Regardless of task, the young children clearly did prefer
the literal over the metaphorical selections for particular items; for
example, over 70% of the 3 year old children selected the literal pairings
"sugar/honey" and "rain/snow" over their metaphorical alternative ("sugar/
snow," and "rain/tears"). With other items the metaphorical pairing was
preferred. Ninety-five percent of the 3 year olds selected "ears/pancakes,"
and 75% of them chose "sun/orange" and "moon/cookie." Still, for the
majority of the items there was no clear preference for either of the
alternatives.
The 3 year old children's failure to distinguish literal from meta-
phorical alternatives in the categorization task is probably not attrib-
utable to total ignorance about the class-defining properties of the
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referents of the words used in the experiment. The children provided
adequate information when they were asked to say what they knew about the
objects compared. But, as other investigators of early child language
have noticed (Bowerman, 1978; Nelson, 1978), they did not seem to have this
information well organized in terms of the relative importance of the
different attributes. Evidence for this was provided in the explanations
of their choices in both tasks. For example, perceptual similarity,
especially similarity in shape, was often the critical dimension on which
both categorization and similarity judgements were based. This dimension
has often been cited as a potent determinant of children's similarity
judgements (Gardner, Winner, Bechhofer & Wolf, 1978; Winner, et al., 1980).
At other times choices appeared to be based on attributes that, from an
adult perspective, seemed to be relatively unimportant (e.g., eyes are
like a bicycle because they are both blue). Sometimes a judgement was
based on an important attribute of the first object but a relatively
unimportant attribute of the second object (e.g., the moon is the same kind
of thing as a shoe because the moon is round and a shoe's heel is round).
Sometimes an important attribute cited for the first object seemed not to
be an attribute of the second object at all (e.g., a river is the same
kind of thing as a cat because a river has water, the sun is like a chair
because the sun is round), and finally sometimes the child provided no
substantive justification whatever (e.g., clouds are like ice cream because
I like ice cream).
Although traces of these types of reasoning were also found in the 4
year old group, children of that age showed that they could reason about
their choices in ways much more similar to those of adults. They could
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easily focus on the important attributes that the two objects shared and
as a result produced many more literal responses, especially in the
categorization task (e.g., a river is the same kind of thing as a lake
because there is water in both of them, a leg is the same kind of thing
as an arm because they are parts of the body, etc.).
Although neither task alone has anything to say about the emergence
of the literal/metaphorical distinction, taken together, they provide a
basis for attributing some metaphoric competence to the 4 year old child.
First, the results of the comparison task showed that all children, even
the 3 year olds, distinguish between two kinds of similarity statements,
those that make sense (i.e., literal and metaphorical) and those that do
not (i.e., anomalous). Further, the results of the categorization task
showed that after about 4 years of age, children are aware that the terms
in such statements belong to different conventional categories. Since
the subjects for both tasks were drawn from the same population and were
tested with the same materials it is reasonable to assume that 4 year olds
both prefer metaphorical to anomalous comparisons and are aware that the
terms involved in metaphorical comparisons do not belong to the same
conventional category, while those in literal comparisons do. It is on
this basis that we are willing to attribute some metaphorical competence
to them. In other words, it appears that by 3 years of age children see
only undifferentiated similarity, distinguishing that from anomaly, while
by 4 they also know that some meaningful similarity statements compare
terms from the same conventional category, while other meaningful compar-
isons involve terms from different categories.
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The failure of the 3 year old children to distinguish literal from
metaphorical similarity statements in the categorization task is compatible
with the possibility, raised in the introduction, that the young child's
renamings might be based merely on the perception of undifferentiated
similarity rather than on metaphorical similarity. However, further
investigation would be needed to resolve this question. It is possible
that the 3 year olds, and maybe even younger children, could distinguish
between literal and metaphorical comparisons in those cases in which they
were very familiar with the items compared, or in which the items in the
literal comparisons shared many properties of a physical/perceptual nature.
It is also possible that the younger children could do better in tasks
involving the use of context, and, of course, in non-verbal tasks that tap
perceptual and functional similarity. If this should turn out to be the
case, the possibility that the renamings of children younger than 4 are
metaphorical in nature would again become viable.
While the present results suggest that one should be cautious about
attributing metaphorical competence to very young children (sometimes
even younger than 2 years old) who engage in renaming, they also argue
against the other extreme, whereby such competence is denied to children
prior to the stage of concrete operations. The finding that by 4 years
of age children appear to be able to distinguish meaningful comparisons
that are literal from those that are metaphorical suggests that they have
their knowledge adequately organized to understand when the terms in a
meaningful comparison belong to different conventional categories, and
that, therefore, they have at least one important prerequisite for metaphor
production and comprehension. However, we say "one important prerequisite"
The Literal-Metaphorical-Anomalous Distinction
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advisedly. The metaphorical comparisons used in this study, as well as
the "so-called" child metaphors usually encountered in the literature,
differ from adult metaphors in certain important respects. First, they
rely almost exclusively on perceptual similarity (and, occassionally, on
similarity between the actions associated with the compared objects).
This is not an accidental phenomenon. The perceptual properties of objects
are very salient for children--in many cases they almost exhaust their
knowledge of objects. For adults, however, perceptual predicates, while
not representing trivial properties of objects, are less central than other
kinds of predicates such as those having to do with causal and structural
relations, functional attributes, etc. (see Carbonell, 1981 for an
interesting discussion of the relative importance of different kinds of
conceptual relations). For example, knowledge of the sort that the sun
is an astronomical object, the center of the solar system, a source of
heat, light and energy, is much more central to the concept of "sun" for
an adult than the perceptual information that it appears to the eye as a
disc and that it has an orange color. In contrast, the perceptual infor-
mation is what the young child mostly knows about the sun and what the
child consequently regards as important. This difference in adult-child
knowledge is probably the main reason why child metaphors appear from an
adult perspective to be relatively impoverished.
A second, related, difference between adult metaphors and child
metaphors is that child metaphors tend to lack salience imbalance.
Typically, adult metaphorical comparisons such as Lectures are like
sleeping pills depend on predicates that are highly salient (conceptually
central) for the B term being less salient for the A term--inducing sleep
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is more central to the concept of sleeping pills than it is to the concept
of lectures. Metaphorical comparisons which rely exclusively on perceptual
or descriptive properties have little, if any, salience imbalance both for
children and for adults, although for different reasons. First, if there
is to be sufficient differentiation of salience levels there needs to be
a rather rich knowledge representation, which the young child might well
lack. Children know relatively little about objects in general, so what
they do know tends to be highly salient. There is, as it were, insufficient
room in the schemas of a young child to permit any significant degree of
salience imbalance. In this sense, the young child's appreciation of
metaphors (both in production and in comprehension) is likely to be rather
limited. Second, for the adult, perceptual properties tend to be sub-
ordinate to more abstract properties, regardless of the object. Thus,
when two objects are metaphorically similar, salience imbalance for per-
ceptual attributes is unlikely.
To the extent that they lack much salience imbalance, metaphorical
comparisons will not exhibit the asymmetries ordinarily characteristic
of them (Ortony, 1979). Thus, while Sleeping pills are like lectures is
very odd in comparison to Lectures are like sleeping pills, Pancakes are
like ears is not much worse that Ears are like pancakes! It does seem to
be the case that the kinds of metaphors children produce and understand
tend not to undergo significant meaning changes when reversed, although
syntactic constraints make some of them sound awkward when reversed.
In conclusion, we speculate that children start with an undiffer-
entiated notion of similarity which at about the age of 4 becomes differ-
entiated into literal and nonliteral similarity. Then, as children gain
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more experience of the world the richness of their knowledge begins to
permit the production and comprehension of nonliteral comparisons which
do not rely solely on descriptive properties of objects but on properties
of a more abstract and relational nature. This knowledge in turn allows
for comparisons between objects whose schemata permit more differentiated
salience levels of their constituents and thus, a more sophisticated
appreciation of metaphor.
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Table 1
Nouns Used as A Terms and B Terms
in the Comparison and Categorization Tasks
B Terms
A TermsA TermsLiteral Metaphorical Anomalous
Alternative Alternative Alternative
rain snow tears dog
eyes ears buttons bicycle
clouds fog ice-cream table
moon star cookie shoe
sugar honey snow road
river lake snake cat
sun moon orange chair
leg arm stick wall
ears eyes pancakes truck
nose mouth mountain bed
Table 2
Mean Number of Literal Responses in the Two Tasks (Out of 10)
Comparison Task Categorization Task
Age
M/L Pair Type L/A Pair Type M/L Pair Type L/A Pair Type
3 4.2 7.1 3.9 6.3
4 4.6 8.1- 7.0 8.8"
5 4.1 8.8 8.8* 9.6*
6 5.9 9.2 8.8* 9.8*
Adult 5.1 10.0 9.5 10.0
Mean Number of Metaphorical Responses
in the Comparison Task
Age M/L Pair Type M/A Pair Type
3 5.8 7.0
4 5.4 8.9
5 5.9 8.8
6 4.1 9.4
Adult 4.9 9.4*
Significant above chance, p < .05
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